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AN UNFORTUNATE AFFAIR: THE BATTLE OF BRIER CREEK AND THE AFTERMATH IN GEORGIA 
by 
WILLIAM HENRY 
(Under the Direction of Solomon K. Smith) 
ABSTRACT 
The Battle of Brier Creek on March 3, 1779 has been overlooked for many years by 
historians of the American War of Independence in Georgia. Because it was so brief and did not 
include massive field armies, the importance of the battle has been ignored. This is unfortunate 
as the Battle of Brier Creek had many severe consequences and changed the direction of the 
war in Georgia. The loss of men, arms, and equipment derailed Patriot offensive plans and gave 
the British valuable time to secure their position in the small frontier colony. It allowed them to 
establish civil government in Georgia while the Patriots were reeling from their losses and the 
unwillingness of the militia to reenlist. Most importantly, the battle reversed the fortunes of 
the opposing armies in Georgia. Prior to the battle, the British had lost their momentum and 
were in danger of being driven out of the state. The Patriots, after their calamity at Savannah, 
were on the move and preparing for a major assault against the British. They had regained the 
initiative and their morale was high. The Battle of Brier Creek changed all of this within a few 
short minutes.  
Few studies on this battle look beyond the engagement and its aftermath. The affects 
on the Patriot and British forces is apparent and yet historical works dealing with the 
Revolution in Georgia often neglect this important engagement. The Battle of Brier Creek 
deserves closer examination. The British Southern Campaign began in Georgia and had it not 
been for the Battle of Brier Creek it could have just as easily ended there.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Purpose of the Study 
 The purpose of this study is to examine the consequences of the Patriot defeat at the 
Battle of Brier Creek. Through the use of primary source material, this study seeks to identify 
the affects, both short and long term that this engagement had on British and Patriot forces in 
the southern colonies. It will investigate how the loss of men, arms, and equipment affected 
the capabilities of the Patriot army in the south. It will also look at how the battle affected 
reenlistments and desertions in the immediate aftermath.  
 Several historians studied the Battle of Brier Creek, but none have provided an analysis 
of the possible consequences of the battle. Instead, these focused on examining the battle with 
little thought of how its outcome altered the course of the war in Georgia and the southern 
colonies as a whole. This study will fill that gap in the historiography and shed light on an 
important battle that has been overlooked for far too long. The Battle of Brier Creek swung 
momentum in favor of the British, crushed Patriot morale, and derailed Rebel offensive plans in 
Georgia. It also provided the British with the opportunity to secure their foothold in the frontier 
colony, which changed the course of the war.  
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  CHAPTER 1 
The Southern Campaign and the Tides of War 
To understand the importance of the Battle of Brier Creek, it is necessary to examine the 
events leading up to that engagement. The British Southern Campaign hinged on success in 
Georgia. Failure to secure the small colony would almost certainly spell disaster for the British 
military. Momentum would be an important factor for both armies, particularly in recruiting for 
loyalist or Patriot militias. The British needed quick and decisive victories in hopes of bringing 
out the many loyalists who were said to inhabit Georgia and South Carolina. Lord George 
Germain wrote to Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell that “The recovery of that province 
alone is in the present situation of American affairs an object of importance in several points of 
view, but in none of such magnitude as its opening an intercourse with the loyal inhabitants of 
the Carolinas and affording the means of reducing those provinces.”1 Clearly, there was little 
room for error for the British. They had to be successful from start to finish or they risked those 
loyal inhabitants thinking better of coming to their aid or even worse, they might join the 
Patriots. The British were able to seize the advantage early with the capture of Savannah; 
however, this would quickly begin to change. Thomas Brown’s defeat in Burke County was the 
first incident to chip away at British initiative. At Augusta, the British were concerned with the 
swelling ranks of Patriot forces across the River and the continuation of raids by the Rebels. 
Colonel Campbell’s withdrawal from Augusta and the rout of a loyalist force at Kettle Creek had 
all but eliminated British momentum. By the time British forces surprised the Rebels at Brier 
Creek, momentum had swung in favor of the Patriots. The Battle of Brier Creek would quickly 
                                                          
1
 Lord George Germain to Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell, 16 January 1779, in K.G. Davies, ed., Documents 
of the American Revolution 1770-1783, 20 vols. (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1976), 17:32.  
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change that and alter the course of the war in the south. It is therefore very important to 
examine these events and the shifts in momentum leading up to the Battle of Brier Creek and 
after. 
 
Figure 1.1. In: Otis Ashmore and Charles Olmstead. Index Map: Kettle Creek and Brier Creek Battle Grounds [map]. 
“The Battles of Kettle Creek and Brier Creek.” The Georgia Historical Quarterly, vol. X, no. 2, (June 1926), 85-125. 
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By 1778, the war in the northern colonies was not going well for the British. As much as 
Sir Henry Clinton wanted to destroy George Washington’s Continental Army, he could not lure 
Washington into a decisive battle in which this could be accomplished. Washington always 
managed to slip away, and as long as his army remained intact, the war would continue. Add to 
this situation the French entry into the war and British success was becoming less and less 
certain. Because of this crisis, Lord George Germain, the Secretary of State for the American 
Colonies, decided it was necessary to shift the war to the south. The idea was that by securing 
the southern colonies, the British would be able to further isolate the northern colonies and cut 
them off from much needed supplies coming from Virginia and the Carolinas.2 The plan laid out 
by Lord Germain first involved the capture of Georgia, and then the army would move up into 
South Carolina, North Carolina and then Virginia. British forces would capture ports and cities, 
then leave them in the protection of loyalist militias as they moved on to their next target. Here 
in lies the problem with the British southern strategy. British intelligence, much of which was 
from exiled loyalists, portrayed the southern colonies as a hotbed of loyalist support. According 
to these sources, all that was needed was a strong show of force by the British Army and Tories 
in the southern population would rally to the King’s Colors and overthrow their patriot 
oppressors. The belief of and reliance on a counterrevolution by loyalist militias proved to be a 
terrible mistake by the British. Their first target was Georgia, which was supposed to be one of 
the most loyal of all of the colonies. It was here in this vital frontier colony that the British 
Southern Campaign began.3 
                                                          
2
 Davies, Documents, 17:12-14. 
3
 David K. Wilson, The Southern Strategy: Britain’s Conquest of South Carolina and Georgia 1775-1780, (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 2005), p.XIII-5. 
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 There were several reasons for choosing Georgia as the initial target in the new 
southern campaign. It would secure the northern border of British Florida. That would allow 
British troops in Florida to move northward to help secure the colony. Georgia also had a 
smaller population and fewer defenders than other colonies. By securing the port of Savannah, 
the British could bring in supplies and reinforcements with ease. Another reason for choosing 
Georgia was that British forces had already attempted to capture Charleston and secure the 
Carolinas in 1776 and failed. This attempt was hampered by poor planning and incompetent 
leadership. After the campaign failed, the southern colonies were largely ignored until 1778. By 
this time, the stakes had been raised as the French entered the war and British success in North 
America depended upon the subjugation of the south.4  
 The plan to capture Georgia involved a landing of British forces near Savannah, as well 
as a force of British regulars and loyalist militia marching from St. Augustine, Florida. The King’s 
forces in Florida were under the command of Major General Augustine Prevost, who became 
the overall commander of British forces in the southern colonies once Savannah was taken. 
General Prevost was ordered to move his men up to the St. Mary’s River and take post there. 
To command the landing party in Georgia, General Clinton chose Lieutenant Colonel Archibald 
Campbell. The force that Campbell would command numbered around 3,000 men, making his 
rank insufficient. To remedy this, Clinton tried to promote Campbell to brigadier general. 
Unfortunately, protests from other officers prevented the promotion from taking place. 
Instead, Campbell received a brigadier general’s salary during the expedition to Georgia while 
maintaining the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Campbell set sail for Savannah on November 9, 
                                                          
4
 Wilson, The Southern Strategy, 59-64. 
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1778, on board the man-of-war Phoenix with his army in tow onboard the many ships that 
made up the British fleet.5   
 On the opposite side, the man in charge of the Southern Department of the Patriot’s 
Continental Army was General Robert Howe. By the fall of 1778, the Continental Congress had 
already decided to relieve Howe of command and replace him with Major General Benjamin 
Lincoln. While waiting for relief from General Lincoln, Howe was forced to move his small army 
into Georgia in an attempt to prevent further raids from Florida. He originally took post at 
Sunbury, but eventually moved north to Savannah. The city was surrounded by a series of 
rundown forts that were built to defend against the Spanish during the French and Indian War. 
After considering the abandonment of Savannah, Howe was compelled by his senior staff to 
stay and defend the city. After some deliberation, the decision was made to construct defenses 
outside of the fortifications to prevent his men from being trapped by the British.6 
 On December 29, 1778, Lieutenant Colonel Campbell began putting his men ashore at 
Girardeau’s Landing about two miles south of Savannah. Colonel Samuel Elbert, who 
commanded the Georgia Continentals at Savannah, recommended that defense of the city be 
made at Brewton’s Hill. This position was about 600 yards from the river and would have 
provided the Americans with an excellent position for shelling the enemy as they came ashore. 
Howe, though, overruled Elbert and decided on a position about one-half mile from the city. He 
sent one company of South Carolina Continentals to delay the British advance, but it was of 
little use. Once onshore, Campbell’s men moved quickly against the Patriot position. It would 
                                                          
5
 Colin Campbell, ed., Journal of an Expedition against the Rebels of Georgia in North America under the Orders of 
Archibald Campbell Esquire Lieut. Colol. of His Majesty’s 71st Regimt. 1778, (Darien, GA: The Ashantilly Press, 
1981), 4-13. 
6
 Wilson, The Southern Strategy, 71-72. 
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have been difficult to disembark the remaining British troops and supplies without first 
controlling Brewton’s Hill. The Patriots fired one volley and retreated under the bayonet charge 
of the redcoats.7 
 
Figure 1.2. Capture of Savannah [map]. In: Jim Byous. The Fortresses of Savannah. 
http://www.sip.armstrong.edu/Forts/Essay.html 
 
                                                          
7
 Wilson, The Southern Strategy, 72-73. 
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Campbell was surprised that more effort was not made to maintain control of the bluff. 
In his report of the engagement, Campbell stated, “had the rebels stationed four pieces of 
cannon on this bluff with 500 men for its defense, it is more than probable, they would have 
destroyed the greatest part of this division of our little army in their progress to the Bluff.”8 This 
failure was a terrible mistake on Howe’s part. Once on land, Campbell clearly had the 
momentum and rapidly prepared his men to move towards Savannah. Before marching to 
Savannah, Campbell sent out scouts to clear the woods around the bluff as well as detachments 
to guard the left and right flanks of the army. Once these precautions were taken, his army 
moved out. As the British approached the city, they discovered that the Rebel line was forming 
about a half mile south of Savannah. Campbell wanted to attack as soon as possible, but 
difficulties in bringing men and material from their landing place meant it was around midday 
before everyone was in position.9   
By two o’clock, the British formed a line along a railed fence on Sir James Wright’s 
plantation, just 800 yards from the American line. The Americans greeted the British with 
artillery barrages, though Campbell was able to keep his men out of the way. The British 
worked quickly to ascertain the disposition of the Americans, and Campbell himself climbed a 
tall tree to get a better view of the battlefield. The American line was formed on a plain just 
across the Savannah Road. The main line was facing west and their right was stretched to a 
thickly wooded area. The American line was in a well defended position, with a marshy area to 
their front and thick woods on their right. Howe ordered the burning of bridges across the 
waterways leading to Savannah as well. Unfortunately for the Americans, the British captured a 
                                                          
8
 Campbell, Journal, 23-24. 
9
 Campbell, Journal, 24-25. 
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slave who gave them a great deal of useful information about the American position. More 
importantly, however, he could guide the British troops through the wooded area on the 
American right. Campbell quickly ordered the Light Infantry to move on the American right, 
while he attacked the center. He also shifted a considerable number of men towards the 
American left, in the hopes of drawing attention away from their right flank. Campbell’s plan 
worked well.10  
Upon receiving the signal that the Light Infantry had made contact on the American 
right, Campbell ordered the Royal Artillery to open up on the American line and his forces 
advanced rapidly towards the Americans “with great Alacrity and Firmness.”11 Howe realized 
that he had been outflanked when he heard musket shots from the barracks on his right. By this 
time, it was too late. The American line was already shifting from the British bombardment. 
Howe, seeing clearly that his army was in danger of being destroyed, ordered a general retreat. 
At first the withdrawal was orderly, but British and German troops charging with fixed bayonets 
turned the retreat into a rout. The American line crumbled. Colonel Huger and Colonel Owen 
Roberts performed a rear guard action that allowed many Americans to escape the city.12 
Among the retreating forces were General Robert Howe and Colonel Samuel Elbert. They had 
to abandon their horses to swim across Yamacraw Creek to safety. The British captured 453 
men of various ranks, and no small quantity of arms and ammunition. This was a severe blow to 
American forces in the south and was a most unfortunate start to the Southern Campaign in 
                                                          
10
 Campbell, Journal, 25-27. 
11
 Campbell, Journal, 27. 
12
 Wilson, The Southern Strategy, 76-77. 
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Georgia. Campbell landed his men at daybreak on December 29, and was in control of Georgia’s 
capital before nightfall.13 
Howe’s army was in full retreat at this point, which gave Lieutenant Colonel Campbell 
ample opportunity to secure various posts in Georgia. He quickly secured Cherokee Hill and the 
town of Ebenezer. With General Prevost set to arrive in Savannah, Campbell held off on any 
further movements into the interior of Georgia, though he was already making plans to take 
Augusta.14 Campbell intended to make a rapid march to Augusta with only a couple of field 
pieces and enough provisions for a month. He hoped that the rapid movement of his troops to 
Augusta would increase his odds of success.15 They also hoped that there would be more 
support from loyalist further into the interior of Georgia. William Moultrie wrote to Colonel 
Charles Pinckney that a deserter informed them of the enemy’s numbers and that most of the 
inhabitants of Georgia had not taken up arms against them. Instead, most of them “delivered 
up their arms and submitted quietly to the British.”16  He went on to say that “I believe they will 
remain neuter, unless we go in with a considerable body, so as to insure success,”17 which 
further highlights the importance of the mood and feelings of the inhabitants. Thus with the 
winning of hearts and minds a priority in Georgia, Colonel Campbell and General Prevost made 
plans to take Augusta. 
On January 24, Colonel Campbell set out from Ebenezer with a force of just over 1,000 
men, consisting of the 1st Battalion 71st Regiment of Foot, the New York Volunteers, Light 
                                                          
13
 Campbell, Journal, 28-29. 
14
Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell to Lord George Germain, 16 January, 1779 in Davies, Documents, 17:36-
38. 
15
 Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell to Lord George Germain, 16 January, 1779 in Davies, Documents, 17:40. 
16
 William Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolution, (New York: Arno Press, 1968), 265. 
17
 Moultrie, Memoirs, 265. 
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Infantry, one troop of Light Dragoons, Carolina Loyalists, the Florida Rangers, and a few units of 
the Royal Artillery. On February 26, the Florida Rangers under command of Colonel Thomas 
Brown were ordered by General Prevost to march westward towards a party of Rebels said to 
be in Burke County. Campbell did not agree with these orders, stating “it was very contrary to 
my Ideas.”18 Campbell had a rather low opinion of Colonel Brown and his Florida Rangers and 
expected them to fail. However, since the order came from General Prevost, he was obliged to 
obey it. Brown and his Rangers set out for Burke County and caught up with the Americans at 
the county court house. After a skirmish with the Americans, Brown was forced to withdraw. He 
suffered casualties and was himself wounded in the action. Campbell notes that they returned 
“seemingly much jaded, and not a little disconcerted with their Repulse.”19 
Thomas Brown’s raid into Burke County was the first of a series of events that would 
shift the momentum in the American’s favor, only to be undone by the events at Brier Creek. 
According to Campbell, “This unfortunate Skirmish made the Rebels retire towards the Upper 
Country, and unite with 600 Men,” bringing their total to about 900.20 Despite this setback, 
Campbell continued his march towards Augusta, encountering only minimal resistance as the 
British army moved northward. On the outskirts of Augusta, he learned from prisoners and 
scouts that the Americans, under General Williamson, had cannon set up to bombard the main 
road into the town. Knowing this, Campbell ordered his men to take a circuitous route and 
enter the town without risk. By February 1, Augusta was under British control.21 
                                                          
18
 Campbell, Journal, 47-48. 
19
 Campbell, Journal, 49. 
20
 Campbell, Journal, 19. 
21
 Campbell, Journal, 50-54. 
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Securing Augusta would be difficult task. Colonel Campbell set about creating defensive 
works around the small town and reconnoitering the area. He was limited by the fact that the 
Americans had taken all of the boats across the Savannah River when they abandoned Augusta. 
Since he had no boats, he could not attack the Rebels across the river. This left the town 
vulnerable to those raiding parties and meant that Campbell could not pursue them across the 
river. One of his volunteers was a ship carpenter, so he was ordered to construct several flat 
boats that could be used to ferry a small detachment of men across the river to attack 
individual elements of the American army under General Williamson. While the boats were 
being constructed, the Patriots launched several raiding parties across the river. One such party 
killed a Light Infantryman named MacAlister, who was posted as a safeguard at the home of an 
American officer to protect his family. This killing severely angered the British and would come 
back to haunt the Patriots at Brier Creek. The safeguard in European warfare was supposed to 
be left alone while he was protecting non-combatants, hence much of the anger after 
MacAlister’s death.22 
Campbell sent detachments into the backcountry as well. In one instance, a group was 
sent to secure a series of small forts meant to protect against Indian attacks. Others were sent 
to recruit loyalists for the militia. The British were expecting a large number of Tories to come 
out and support the King’s Army. However, that expectation was much too high. Instead of the 
roughly 6,000 Tories that were supposed to be hiding in the Georgia backcountry, the British 
found barely 1,100. This had much to do with the uncertain position of the little British army in 
Augusta. It is very likely that most loyalists, or even neutrals, were concerned that the British 
                                                          
22
 Campbell, Journal, 55-57. 
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could not adequately protect them or their families. There was also the very real possibility of 
Campbell being forced to withdraw from Augusta, leaving Tories at the mercy of their Patriot 
neighbors. The possibility of withdrawal was highlighted by the growing force of Patriots across 
the river. Campbell’s hope rested with Colonel Boyd and his loyalist militia. Boyd was marching 
towards Augusta with approximately 600 loyalists ready to assist Campbell. This would do little 
to assuage the fears of local Tories. The news of a force of 1,600 Patriots under Generals Ashe 
and O’Brien which were moving to rendezvous with General Williamson’s army, made the 
situation even bleaker. Campbell’s little army of just over 1,000 men would be outnumbered by 
a Patriot force of almost 3,800.23  
By February 14, Colonel Campbell decided it was in his army’s best interest to withdraw 
from Augusta to a more defensible position that would allow for more and better 
communication and supply. This was a necessary precaution considering the fact that 
overwhelming Loyalist support he was counting on never materialized. In explaining this 
withdrawal to Lord George Germain, General Prevost noted that, “The object of this expedition 
was to open the back country, to bring to the test the often made professions of loyalty of its 
inhabitants by this appearance of support in their neighborhood to countenance their rising in 
arms.”24 This clearly illustrates the need for loyalist support in Georgia. It was of such 
importance that both Colonel Campbell and General Prevost were willing to risk a part of their 
army to take Augusta and recruit a loyalist militia. Prevost went on to say, “without such rising 
both hearty and powerful it would be very difficult if not impossible to supply or sustain so 
                                                          
23
 Campbell, Journal, 58-61. 
24
 Davies, Documents, 17:76-77. 
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distant a post.”25 It is obvious that Campbell’s position in Augusta was precarious, with no boats 
and a much larger force of Americans opposite him across the river. Campbell was also 
concerned that his retreat might be cut off. Campbell wrote in his journal “there were six deep 
Ravines between us and General Prevost’s Army; At any of which, 1000 determined Men might 
keep us for many Days at Bay, in Opposition to our best Efforts to dislodge them.”26 With these 
concerns at the forefront of his mind, Campbell withdrew from Augusta on February 14, 
disappointed in the outcome of the expedition. The very same day Colonel Boyd’s loyalist 
militia came under attack from Patriot forces. 
Colonel Boyd was marching south from South Carolina to link up with Colonel Campbell. 
On February 14, he set up camp on a farm on the north side of Kettle Creek. Despite early 
skirmishes with Patriot forces, he did not consider himself or his army in any real danger. He 
ordered the horses set loose to graze, and his men began preparing food. It was a much needed 
rest, since they had been marching for the past few days. The Patriots, under command of 
Colonel Pickens, were following Boyd closely. When Boyd stopped at Kettle Creek, Pickens sent 
scouts to reconnoiter the area. From those scouts, Pickens learned that Boyd’s army was 
unprepared for an attack. He immediately set his army in motion, despite being outnumbered. 
Pickens hoped that surprise would level the playing field. Boyd was indeed surprised, first 
learning of the attack from gunshots fired by his pickets. Colonel Boyd quickly reorganized his 
men, but Pickens had already obtained the most favorable ground and was able to flank the 
column of men being led by Boyd. It was during this period of fighting that Colonel Boyd was 
mortally wounded. The battle lasted for almost two hours before the Tories fled the field. It was 
                                                          
25
 Davies, Documents, 17:77. 
26
 Campbell, Journal, 64. 
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a bloody battle that resulted in 70 Tory dead, and 75 wounded. The Americans lost 9 dead, and 
20 wounded. The Patriots defeated a Tory force of between 600 to 800 men, and did so with a 
much smaller force.27 
This was a tremendous setback for the British in Georgia as it no doubt further 
discouraged Loyalist support in the backcountry and elsewhere. The British were met with 
success early in the campaign as they easily captured Savannah and proceeded to take control 
of the surrounding areas. Their march northward to Augusta was likewise easily accomplished. 
The expedition of Colonel Campbell to Augusta, while contested, was still a success, though it 
was to be the last major success until the Battle of Brier Creek. The British reached Augusta 
expecting an outpouring of support from the locals, but that would not be the case. The hope 
of a loyalist counterrevolution against the patriots in Georgia was put to rest at Augusta. All the 
while the Americans were building up their forces across the Savannah River. By this point it is 
obvious that momentum was shifting. Campbell was compelled to withdraw from Augusta 
rather than risk the destruction of his army, while on the same day, Patriot forces crushed 
Colonel Boyd’s Tories at Kettle Creek. With Campbell in retreat, the Americans could now link 
their armies for an attack on Savannah.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
27
 Otis Ashmore and Charles H. Olmstead, “The Battles of Kettle Creek and Brier Creek,” The Georgia Historical 
Quarterly, vol. X, no. 2, (June, 1926), 95-99. 
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CHAPTER 2 
General Ashe’s Unlucky Affair at Brier Creek 
The British withdrawal from Augusta coincided with a terrible defeat of Loyalist forces at 
Kettle Creek. Up to this point, the British had enjoyed a series of successful expeditions in 
Georgia. First taking Savannah and then moving north to outposts like Ebenezer. When 
Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell set out to take Augusta, he met but minimal resistance 
along the way. The first major defeat of the expedition came during Thomas Brown’s raid into 
Burke County, when his Florida Rangers were repulsed by a group of Patriots. Brown was even 
wounded during the affair. This began a shift in fortunes in favor of the Rebels. Upon reaching 
Augusta, Campbell found only a fraction of the loyalists he had hoped for and had to watch as 
the Patriot army across the river swelled to more than twice the size of his own. Furthermore, 
Campbell could not even cross the river to attack his opposition due to the lack of boats. As his 
position became more and more precarious, he was finally compelled to withdraw back down 
the Savannah River towards General Prevost’s army. The same day that he abandoned Augusta, 
Colonel Boyd’s Loyalist militia was annihilated at Kettle Creek. It is obvious that the British had 
failed to inspire confidence in the local Tories and even more so among the neutral inhabitants. 
The situation was beginning to look bleak for the British Southern Campaign, but the Battle of 
Brier Creek would reverse their fortunes. 
 Upon leaving Augusta, Colonel Campbell marched his men to Boggy Gut Creek where 
they set up camp. Campbell continued marching southward over the next few days, as General 
Prevost thought it was a good idea to further shorten their communication and supply lines. In 
a letter to Campbell, General Prevost stated that he believes General Benjamin Lincoln intends 
26 
 
to cross the Savannah River and cut off his retreat. Such a movement would have left Colonel 
Campbell with a Rebel force to his front and another to his rear; a dangerous prospect to say 
the least. Prevost could not move to assist Campbell without leaving Savannah vulnerable. With 
this information, Colonel Campbell prepared his men to meet General Lincoln’s army. However, 
the attack never materialized. Still, Campbell thought it prudent to continue southward and 
arrived at Hudson’s Ferry on February 20. While at this post Campbell met up with Lieutenant 
Colonel James Prevost who took command of the army once Campbell left for Savannah. 
Campbell was to help with the implementation of civil government in Georgia, but before this, 
he gave Colonel Prevost a great deal of valuable information and a plan to attack the Rebels 
following him southward.28 
 Campbell already had a plan in mind to ambush the Patriots. He believed that they 
would stop at Brier Creek, giving Colonel Prevost an opportunity to feint towards their front, 
while sending the remainder of the army back upstream and around the creek at Paris’s Mills. 
This would leave the Rebels with little room to maneuver and no easy line of retreat. 
Campbell’s advice was sound and made an impression upon Colonel Prevost. More intelligence 
of an impending attack by Lincoln compelled Campbell to move further south with General 
John Ashe not far behind, shadowing his path back down.29  
 The Patriots were trailing the British, not pursuing a general action, but attempting to 
keep pushing them back towards Savannah until a suitable time developed for them to link up 
with General Lincoln and his forces. Ashe had around 1,100 troops under his command, but 
they were mostly militia. General Ashe met with General Lincoln during a council of war on 
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March 1 to devise a plan to move against Savannah. While at this meeting, General Ashe left his 
army at Brier Creek and had set some of them to repairing the bridge, which Colonel Campbell 
destroyed after crossing. Ashe assured Generals Lincoln and Moultrie that his position was 
secure. After all, he had Brier Creek to his left and a deep swamp on his right, meaning the 
enemy could not outflank him. He also believed the enemy to be afraid of him, since they 
thought he had a much larger force than them. This was obviously not the case.30  
 Once it was realized by Colonel Prevost that the Rebels encamped at Brier Creek were 
only there to prevent communication with the upper part of the colony and to threaten his 
army, he set Colonel Campbell’s plan in motion. Colonel Prevost’s desire was to remove this 
threat to his army, open the upper part of the colony to communication, and prevent General 
Ashe from linking up with General Lincoln’s army at Purrisburg. Colonel Prevost sent Major 
McPherson and the 1st Battalion of the 71st Regiment, along with some irregulars and a couple 
of field pieces, to move towards the burned out bridge at Brier Creek to mask the movement of 
the rest of the army. Prevost took the 2nd Battalion of the 71st Regiment, Sir James Baird’s 
Light Infantry, and three companies of Florida Grenadiers on a circular route around Brier Creek 
in an attempt to get to the American rear. The plan required surprise and Colonel Prevost 
hoped that the feint towards the bridge would be sufficient to hold the attention of the Rebels 
across the creek, while he swung his army around from upstream.31  
 Several things happened leading up to the battle that influenced the outcome. First and 
foremost, a detachment of horse under command of Colonel Marberry made contact with the 
British well before their attack on the American camp at Brier Creek. Strangely, this information 
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was inexplicably kept within that party. Secondly, a detachment of horse under Major Ross was 
sent out on the morning of March 3rd to reconnoiter the enemy. This left General Ashe without 
a substantial mounted unit to quickly employ against the British. Finally, the American army at 
Brier Creek was poorly equipped and had no entrenching tools to build a defensive work 
around their camp. Combine with this the experience and superior equipment of the British and 
things begin to look grim indeed.32  
General Ashe’s first warning of an impending attack came from an express rider. This 
was confirmed moments later by a message from Colonel Smith. General Ashe immediately 
ordered the drums to beat to arms and began to order his men into position. The order was 
given to distribute cartridges; however, many were of the wrong caliber.33 Furthermore, the 
lack of Cartouche Boxes for most of the troops meant that many men were running to their 
positions “carrying their Cartridges under their arms, others in the bosoms of their shirts, and 
some tied up in the corners of their hunting shirts.”34 The army was drawn up into two lines 
with General Elbert’s Georgia Continentals forming the center of the front line, the New Bern 
Regiment on the left, and the Edenton Regiment on the right. The Halifax and Wilmington 
Regiments made up a second line with about 70 or 80 yards in between.35 
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 It was about 3 o’clock in the afternoon when the British appeared, just 15 minutes after 
General Ashe received warning from an express rider. The British were marching in three 
columns in close formation, six abreast. As they reached 150 yards, the British deployed their 
columns to the left and right to form a line with the Florida Rangers and another mounted unit 
in reserve. At this point, the Georgia Continentals and the Edenton Regiment under Colonel 
Perkins opened fire. After two or three rounds, General Elbert’s Georgians moved forward a 
few paces. As they did so, they drifted slightly to the left in front of the New Bern Regiment. 
According to General Ashe, “By this movement, and that of the Edenton Regiment, which had 
been obliged to move a little to the Right, there was a vacancy in the line.”36 Colonel Prevost 
was no fool. He sought to exploit the opening immediately and gave the order to charge with 
bayonets. General Ashe’s army was comprised mostly of militia and therefore had no bayonets 
to defend themselves. As such, the line crumbled as the British surged forward.37  
 The Halifax Regiment was the first to break and did so without firing a single shot. Next, 
most of the Wilmington and New Bern Regiments broke and fled the field. Only the Edenton 
Regiment of Colonel Perkins and General Elbert’s Georgia Continentals remained in action. 
General Ashe had already moved to the rear in hopes of rallying his men. It was of no use, since 
just a few moments later the Edenton Regiment gave way.38 During the charge, one of the 
Highlanders of the Light Infantry yelled out, “Now my Boys, remember poor Macalister!” As a 
result, this unit “spared very few that came within their Reach.”39 The British were exacting 
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their revenge for the killing of the safeguard named MacAlister by Patriots at Augusta. This act 
was considered barbaric and went against an established tradition in European warfare. At 
Brier Creek, the British got the opportunity to avenge the killing of one of their comrades, which 
they did several times over.40  
With the lines breaking away all around them, General Elbert’s Georgians held their 
ground and continued firing. It was not until they were completely surrounded that Elbert 
finally surrendered. This was a testament to the differences between Continental troops and 
militia. It also highlights why Continentals were so valuable to American commanders. In the 
face of a British bayonet charge, Continental regulars could be expected to hold their ground 
and continue fighting. In the case of the militia, it rarely took something as dire as a bayonet to 
encourage their departure from the field. By the time Elbert and his Georgia Continentals 
surrendered, General Ashe had given up trying to rally the men, who by this point, were 
running in every direction. Ashe turned to the swamp and proceeded to make his escape. He 
was fortunate that he was able to avoid capture, as were many others. Mainly this resulted 
from the British soldiers stopping to plunder the American camp which was almost entirely 
intact. This gave Ashe and many men the chance to escape and avoid capture or death. The 
British so completely surprised the Rebels at Brier Creek that they had to leave their camp with 
cook fires burning to rush out to form a line of battle. During the retreat, most of the men 
threw down their arms and belongings in order to get away with their lives.41  
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 The Battle of Brier Creek was a crushing defeat for the Rebels in Georgia and South 
Carolina. General William Moultrie stated that, “Gen. Ashe’s affair at Brier-Creek, was nothing 
less than a total rout.” He went on to say, “never was an army more compleatly surprised [sic], 
and never were men more panic struck.”42 The British were in agreement as to the outcome of 
the battle. General Augustine Prevost wrote to Lord George Germain, “The rebels being in 
some measure surprised on the 3rd instant were totally defeated and dispersed.”43 Not only 
was General Ashe’s army routed, it lost almost all of its supplies and provisions. Arms, 
ammunition, and seven cannon were among the list of items seized by the British. This was 
particularly important for an army that could barely arm and supply its troops. The sheer 
number of casualties was also a devastating blow to the Americans. One hundred and fifty were 
killed, many drowned while attempting to swim across the creek or Savannah River. Nearly 200 
were taken prisoner, including over 20 officers. Most of those captured were from General 
Elbert’s Georgia Continentals, including Elbert himself. By contrast, the British lost just five 
privates killed, and eleven others wounded, including one officer.44  
 The Battle of Brier Creek ended all hopes the Patriots had of retaking Georgia. All 
offensive plans were put on hold as the American southern army withdrew to South Carolina 
and attempted to regroup and rebuild. The loss of men and supplies was a severe blow to 
General Lincoln and his army. This is particularly true in the case of the entire Georgia regiment 
of Continental troops being captured, along with General Elbert, who was an able officer and an 
asset to Lincoln. Officers and Continental troops were especially hard to come by in the 
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southern colonies. The loss at Brier Creek also affected the ability of the Patriots to retain 
troops whose enlistments were up, and give the British time to further their efforts to build 
defenses in and around Savannah. Morale in the American camp suffered greatly, while British 
morale received an obvious boost. More importantly, the Battle of Brier Creek put the British 
back in control of their own destiny in Georgia.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Losing the Momentum and the War in Georgia 
The Battle of Brier Creek was a disaster for the Patriots. General William Moultrie 
stated, “Gen. Ash’s affair at Brier-Creek, was nothing less than a total rout; never was an army 
more compleatly surprised [sic], and never were men more panic struck.”45 It was true. General 
Ashe and his army were caught completely off their guard, and they paid dearly for it. More 
importantly, the American army in the south paid dearly. The loss of arms and ammunition was 
devastating. As was the loss of so many Continental troops, whose value in battle cannot be 
doubted. General Ashe continued to lose men even after the action, as none of them were 
willing to extend their service.  There are several reasons why this battle was so unfortunate for 
the Americans in the southern colonies, many of which have been overlooked. The 
consequences of this battle were diverse and far reaching. Most importantly, however, the 
battle of Brier Creek changed the course of the war in Georgia; it gave the British the 
opportunity to build defenses in and around Savannah and it allowed the British to plan their 
next major offensive: Charleston. 
 At first glance, one might overlook the importance of the Battle of Brier Creek. It was a 
short battle, and engaged only a small fraction of the troops in the south, both British and 
American. It did not occur near any major cities, but happened in a back woods section of 
Georgia surrounded by swamps and creeks. Still, the outcome of this battle had lasting 
consequences and changed the nature of the war in Georgia in many ways. Furthermore it 
ensured the continuation of the British campaign in the southern colonies. 
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 The British strategy in Georgia relied heavily on acquiring large numbers of loyalists to 
form militias. These could maintain control over areas under Royal control. The British believed 
that a strong loyalist militia would be capable of providing security and defense for captured 
towns. After all, much of the American army was militia and no better trained or equipped than 
the loyalist militias created by the British. This would allow the British regulars to move on to 
new targets, without being concerned that a Patriot force would take back what the British had 
acquired. The importance of British dependence on loyalist support in the southern colonies 
cannot be overstated. The British were counting on the loyalists in Georgia to rise up against 
the patriots as soon as the Royal Colors were in sight. Without the counterrevolution by Tories, 
the British southern strategy was doomed to failure. General Augustine Prevost was keenly 
aware of this situation when he wrote to Lord George Germain, “The object of this expedition 
was to open the back country, to bring to the test the often made professions of loyalty of its 
inhabitants, and by this appearance of support in their neighborhood to countenance their 
rising in arms and give an opportunity if they were so inclined of manifesting an active zeal for 
His Majesty’s and their country’s service.”46 Prevost, however, was skeptical from the 
beginning. The southern colonies had been under patriot control for quite some time. He was 
not surprised that loyalist support had only partially materialized, but he knew that without 
loyalist support, there was little chance of British success. About the loyalist uprising that they 
had hoped for, Prevost wrote, “in this view we were disappointed, or no rising of consequence 
made that we know of, and without such rising both hearty and powerful it would be very 
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difficult if not impossible to supply or sustain so distant a post.”47 This clearly shows the 
importance of a loyalist uprising in the southern colonies. Prevost knew that to maintain control 
in the south, he needed loyalists to step up and fight back against their Patriot adversaries. Only 
then would the British be able to move on to their next objective. 
 Gaining the support of loyalists required a show of force by the British. This meant not 
simply showing up with an army, but rather the British had to exhibit the ability to drive out the 
Patriots and protect any loyalists who came to the King’s aid. In this sense, the momentum of 
the opposing armies became very important. After the quick seizure of Savannah, the British 
seemed unstoppable. Colonel Campbell then proceeded to march, almost unimpeded, 
northward up the Savannah River. By this point, it is clear that the momentum rested solely 
with the British in Georgia. The rapid advance put the Rebel forces on their heels, and they 
could do little to stop the onslaught of the King’s army. As Campbell marched toward Augusta, 
things began to turn around for the Patriots. Thomas Brown’s raid into Burke County was 
violently repulsed by a group of Patriots they were sent to disperse or capture and the number 
of Patriots forming up across the river from Augusta continued to swell. Even after taking 
Augusta, Campbell found few loyalists willing to join the militia. More than likely, this was due 
to the threat of Patriot reprisals, since there was no guarantee that the British would be able to 
maintain control of the upper part of Georgia. When it became apparent that his army was in 
danger, Campbell had no choice but to withdraw. No longer were Patriot forces retreating in 
the face of superior British soldiers; instead the British army was withdrawing from Augusta 
due to the growing force of Rebels across the river.  
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 To make matters worse, the same day that Campbell withdrew from Augusta, a Tory 
force under Colonel Boyd was crushed at Kettle Creek. Campbell had no option other than to 
move further and further south, with a Patriot army shadowing his every move. General 
Prevost was concerned that Colonel Campbell’s army might be cut off and wanted him to move 
closer to Savannah and reinforcements. Prevost obviously felt that Savannah was still in danger. 
In a letter to Campbell, Prevost stated that he “cannot move without uncovering Savannah.” He 
went on to warn Campbell, “Judge then if it is not dangerous to be so far divided. I have neither 
Carts nor Harness, I cannot pretend to supply you; not now.”48 In another letter, which 
Campbell received a day later, General Prevost reiterated his concern, stating, “also 
recommending to your Consideration the Propriety or otherways, of your falling still farther 
back.”49 It is clear that by this point the momentum had completely shifted to the Patriots. They 
were able to threaten the British, all the while their forces continued to grow and new militia 
units made their way south. Colonel Campbell was well aware of the tenuous situation in 
Georgia and that momentum was no longer an advantage that they enjoyed. After receiving 
orders to return to England, Campbell sent a letter to General Prevost offering his opinion on 
securing the province. In it he states, “When I consider the Strength of His Majesty’s Forces in 
Georgia, and that of the Rebels on the opposite Banks of the Savannah, I am inclined to think it 
would be imprudent at this Juncture, to follow other Views than those of securing the Conquest 
already made,” and that the most attention should be paid to “The security of Savannah, 
Ebenezer, and Sundbury.”50  Despite the sizable British force in Georgia, it was quickly being 
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outnumbered by its Patriot counterpart. This added a great deal of risk for any detachments 
being sent out beyond the already captured posts. Campbell knew that their best bet was to 
entrench themselves at their current position. This meant that most of Georgia would remain 
under Patriot control, but it was too dangerous to risk what they already had. The British 
needed a victory large enough to slow the Patriots, and perhaps put them on the defensive 
once again. As it turned out, they got what they were looking for at Brier Creek.51 
 After the defeat of General John Ashe’s forces at Brier Creek, the British felt their 
position was much more secure. According to General Prevost, “The rebels will not again, at 
least for some time, much disturb us in this province.”52 General Prevost was aware of the 
particularly high casualties, as well as the large number of Rebels taken prisoner. He expected 
such a loss to be severely detrimental to the Patriots and most advantageous to himself and his 
troops. Along with the relative peace that he expected “for some time,”53 Prevost also expected 
communication to be much more secure to the back country. He even dispatched emissaries to 
attempt to communicate, not only with loyalists in the back country, but also the Native 
Americans.54 
 Prevost was equally confident in a letter to General Sir Henry Clinton. Prevost stated, “if 
an additional Force could possibly be spared to attack Charles Town, where there are few of the 
Continental Troops left, I am convinced the Conquest of South Carolina would be easily 
accomplished.”55 Such a bold suggestion shows the shift in fortunes to the British. Prevost knew 
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that his position was now considerably more secure, and with reinforcements he might even be 
able to take Charleston while they had the Rebels on their heels. In addition to this, he felt 
confident enough to send the Light Infantry, South Carolina Light Horse, and the Rangers to 
take up a post within 40 miles from Augusta as a show of strength and support for the 
inhabitants of the upper part of Georgia.56 This statement is in stark contrast to his earlier 
insistence that Colonel Campbell continue marching southward closer to Savannah and 
reinforcements. Prevost was very concerned at having a small army so far from reinforcements 
and in an area where it might be surrounded by a larger force of Rebels. The Battle of Brier 
Creek changed all of this. It is clear that Prevost no longer considered the Patriots a real threat 
to his troops. Otherwise, he would not have detached such a small force to secure an area so 
close to Augusta, an environment that turned out to be less than friendly to the British. The 
rout of General Ashe’s army at Brier Creek, however, gave the British a significant boost in 
confidence and morale as well as shifted momentum to His Majesty’s forces in Georgia.57 
 If the British were keenly aware of their good fortunes after the Battle of Brier Creek, 
there can be no doubt that the Americans were equally aware of their misfortune. The Patriots 
had the advantage, and were increasing their ranks prior to the battle. Their growing army was 
enough of a concern to compel Colonel Campbell to withdraw from Augusta. General Prevost 
was likewise concerned, recommending that Campbell continue to move south towards 
Savannah, closer to support. After the Battle of Kettle Creek, things seemed to be going well for 
the Patriots. But the Battle of Brier Creek quickly changed all of that. A sizable piece of the 
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Rebel army was obliterated, which limited any future offensive plans in Georgia by the Patriots. 
According to General William Moultrie, “This unlucky affair at Brier-Creek, disconcerted all our 
plans,” and “the war was protracted at least one year longer.” He went on to say that, “it is not 
to be doubted that had we have crossed the river with our army, and joined Gen. Ash, which 
we were preparing to do, we should have had a body of 7,000 men.”58 This force would have 
been roughly double the size of that of the British forces in Georgia, constituting a serious 
threat to the British’s ability to hold onto Savannah. At the very least, General Lincoln could 
have kept the British bottled up in Savannah. With proper artillery, he could even prevent the 
influx of supplies into the city. Moultrie believed that it would have been possible to not only 
drive the British out of Georgia, but stop the invasion of the Carolinas.59 
 General Benjamin Lincoln, the commander of the Patriot army in the southern colonies, 
thought of the Battle of Brier Creek in terms that were similar to the views of Moultrie. With 
such a staggering defeat, he knew that his plans to move against the British and maintain 
control of the upper half of the state were no longer an option. In a letter to Governor Rutledge 
on March 4, 1779, Lincoln expressed his concern after he received “the very disagreeable 
information of Gen. Ashe’s defeat.” He went on to say, “By this stroke we shall be driven to the 
necessity of collecting our force to one point, and leave the upper part of the country 
uncovered; the consequence of which may be the loss of it.”60 As a result of Brier Creek, Lincoln 
decided it was necessary to keep his army intact and in one location. This would give him a 
large enough army to deter the British from attacking. The problem, as he mentioned to 
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Rutledge, is that this action would require him to leave the upper part of Georgia unprotected. 
The loss of so many men and supplies at Brier Creek was obviously much more than just a 
nuisance. It forced General Lincoln to take actions to protect the whole of his army and 
abandon Georgia for the time being. In the aftermath of Brier Creek, he could not risk losing 
another large piece of his army to the British. 
 It is not surprising that General Lincoln wanted to consolidate his forces. But it also 
clearly exhibits the rapid change in the nature of the war in Georgia. Instead of being able to 
harass the British and push them back towards Savannah, Lincoln was compelled to withdraw 
his forces back to South Carolina and lose Georgia completely. The need to regroup also 
showed how detrimental the loss of men, arms, and supplies were to any future offensive 
operations. Colonel Campbell knew that the Rebels were in trouble. According to Campbell, 
“The Defeat at Briar’s Creek was productive of good Consequences, as the whole of the Rebels 
after this Discomfiture withdrew themselves to South Carolina.”61 He went on to say that the 
Rebels, “united their Chief Force under General Lincoln at Purisburg.”62 In this case, actions 
speak louder than words. For quite some time, General Lincoln had to refrain from any large 
scale operations. The Battle of Brier Creek cost the Patriots a great deal. Momentum was not 
the only loss the Patriots suffered. Soldiers, Officers, supplies, and arms were all substantial 
losses to the Patriot army, and all were difficult to replace, especially the officers and 
Continental troops.63 
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 Another important consequence of the Battle of Brier Creek, and an often overlooked 
one at that, is the fact that it gave the British a great deal of time to secure their position in 
Georgia. Even after their success at Brier Creek, their immediate concern was still to fortify and 
secure the gains that they had already made. General Prevost was adamant that they not lose 
what had already been gained and nothing would change that. The victory at Brier Creek 
changed the amount of time that was available to the British to secure the posts at Savannah, 
Sunbury, and Ebenezer. It allowed the British to work without the threat of attack. It also gave 
them a chance to focus on one of their primary objectives: establishing a civil government in 
Savannah. 
 As of March 1, 1779, the British were still rushing to complete a series of redoubts 
around Savannah. With General Lincoln camped at Purrisburg with at least 2,000 men, there 
was always the threat of an attack on Savannah. Campbell was “At Savannah employed in 
hurrying on the Redoubts and Public Works.”64 He was also forming a plan for ensuring the 
security of Savannah and the surrounding posts, which he would submit to General Prevost.65 
On March 2, Campbell sent his proposal for the defense of Savannah. He believed it should be 
protected, no matter what the Patriots did. His principal concern was the vulnerability of an 
attack on Savannah from Purrisburg. He wrote, “At present Savannah appears to me to be too 
much exposed to the Attempts of a flying Corps from Purrisburg and I know not any Attack by 
which they can injure us so much.”66 This was not merely the result of a large force under the 
command of General Lincoln. Colonel Campbell’s concern was a rapid attack in which the 
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Rebels would engage in “burning the Metropolis, spiking up the Guns, and destroying our 
Provisions.”67  
He was not as concerned with the city being overrun as he was with it being burned to 
the ground by a hit and run attack. This type of threat would remain well after the events at 
Brier Creek, as it would require only a limited number of horsemen to make such a daring raid 
possible. However, the likelihood of this happening decreased as British fortifications increased. 
Campbell outlined a solution to this problem. A large part of it was increasing the size of the 
garrison in Savannah. The other part of the plan included the immediate completion of 
redoubts at all posts, including “proper Guard-houses and Sentry Boxes.”68 This type of work 
took time, however. Time was something that seemed to be running out for the British prior to 
their victory at Brier Creek. General Lincoln was briefing his officers on plans for an offensive 
into Georgia. The first part of Lincoln’s plan was the unification of the various armies under his 
command. But after the events at Brier Creek, unification was no longer an option. General 
Prevost completed the redoubts without the constant threat of an attack by Lincoln. In a letter 
to Lord George Germain he stated, “The rebels will not again, at least for some time, much 
disturb us in this province.”69 He went on to say that, “In the meantime, whilst we guard what 
we have already got, we hold ourselves in readiness to catch at further favourable incidents as 
they may occur.”70 The British could now complete work on their defenses unmolested, while 
looking for opportunities to attack Patriot forces. This was a substantial shift from focusing 
solely on securing Savannah, which both Campbell and Prevost had previously vouched for. 
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Before the Battle of Brier Creek, both General Prevost and Colonel Campbell believed that they 
should focus on securing their current positions, as it was too risky to attempt further offensive 
operations. This added pressure on General Lincoln and restricted the movement of his forces. 
The added security after their victory at Brier Creek also allowed them to focus more on 
establishing a civil government. 
Upon reviewing the evidence, it is obvious that the Battle of Brier Creek radically shifted 
the momentum of the war in Georgia in favor of the British. The British had the initial 
advantage, with an easy victory at Savannah and rapidly securing the surrounding areas. 
Colonel Campbell was then able to march north and take Augusta, meeting only minimal 
resistance along the way. It was here, however, that things began to change. First and 
foremost, the loyalist counterrevolution that the British hoped for never materialized. This left 
Campbell and his men at a distant post with a Rebel army just across the river, whose ranks 
were growing daily. Campbell was compelled to withdraw on the same day that Patriot forces 
crushed a Tory force under Colonel Boyd at the Battle of Kettle Creek. Campbell was forced to 
keep falling further and further back down the river to safety. By March 3, the Patriots were 
doing the acting and the British were forced to react. Had it not been for the unlucky event at 
Brier Creek, it is probable that General Lincoln could have, at the very least, bottled the British 
up in Savannah, which would have been very detrimental to British aims in the southern 
colonies. Securing the Georgia back country and establishing contact with loyalists and Native 
Americans there would no longer have been an option; nor would advancing into South 
Carolina and taking Charleston and the surrounding areas.   
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Instead, the victory at Brier Creek gave the British the breathing room they needed to 
prepare for future operations against the Americans, both offensive and defensive in nature. 
General Lincoln, on the other hand, was forced to put his offensive plans on hold and try to 
regroup his army. Almost all of the American forces in Georgia withdrew into South Carolina, 
giving the British ample opportunity to construct defensive works around Savannah and 
establish a civil government in Georgia. General Prevost even sent a detachment to take post 
near Augusta to defend against raids from South Carolina. After the defeat of General Ashe’s 
army at Brier Creek, Prevost was more confident in the security of the British position in 
Georgia and his actions bear this out. For the British, they could not have asked for a better 
outcome than what transpired at Brier Creek. It was a most advantageous affair for the King’s 
forces in Georgia, while it was a disaster for the American southern army. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Men, Ammo, and Equipment 
 The Battle of Brier Creek was costly for the Patriots in many respects. It resulted in a 
significant shift in momentum in favor of the British, and it effectively put the Rebels back on 
the defensive. General Benjamin Lincoln’s plans to attack the British in Georgia were no longer 
an option. For well over a month, General Lincoln had been working to increase the size of his 
army. He was also expecting reinforcements from other states. When Lieutenant Colonel 
Archibald Campbell withdrew from Augusta, General Lincoln summoned his officers for a 
meeting to discuss offensive plans. The goal was to force Colonel Campbell back to Savannah, 
then unite all of the American forces in the area. According to General William Moultrie, 
bringing together General Ashe’s army, General Lincoln’s army, and that of General Williamson, 
along with other smaller forces scattered across Georgia and South Carolina, Lincoln would 
have had an army of nearly 7,000 men. This was roughly twice the size of the British forces in 
Georgia, giving Lincoln a fair chance to, at the very least, bottle up the British at Savannah or at 
best, drive them out completely. Since most of this force was comprised of militia and as such, 
General Lincoln could not afford to lose men. To be successful, Lincoln needed as large a force 
as possible because the militia was often unreliable in battle. This is one of the reasons that the 
Battle of Brier Creek was so devastating to American war efforts in Georgia. The losses to men, 
arms, and supplies were severe.71 
 For an army to be completely functional and in turn successful in any engagements, it 
must first be well supplied and equipped. This includes, but is not limited to, provisions, 
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clothing, blankets and rum, ammunition and weaponry as well as artillery pieces. For the 
American army in the southern colonies, these were rather difficult to come by without 
disturbing the local populace. Since the Continental Congress did not have the power to tax, it 
was left to the individual states to supply and equip state militias and Continental regiments. 
This resulted in the American forces being poorly equipped for war upon arrival compared to 
their British adversaries, who were well armed and equipped. It also made it exceedingly 
difficult to obtain more weapons and ammunition, as well as supplies like clothing and blankets. 
Any losses of said arms and supplies became a serious consideration amongst the American 
officers in Georgia and South Carolina. 
 The Battle of Brier Creek lasted for just a few turbulent minutes. During the battle and in 
the confusion of a British bayonet charge, the vast majority of the Americans threw their 
weapons down and ran as fast as they could. The Georgia Continentals under General Elbert 
stood their ground and fought but were eventually forced to surrender, losing all of their 
weapons in the process. The retreating Americans left everything behind. They were not 
concerned with taking their baggage, weapons, food, or any other belongings they might have 
had. The only thing they wanted to escape with was their lives. This turned out to be a stroke of 
good luck for the Americans in some ways, since the British troops stopped to plunder the 
American camp rather than chase after them and kill them. This delay kept the British from 
catching up to General Ashe’s fleeing army. While this may have saved some men from capture 
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or worse, the loss of so much equipment was a severe blow to the American Cause, and added 
to the equipment already at the disposal of the British.72 
 General Augustine Prevost, in a letter to Lord George Germain, made a point to note 
that the American loss of arms and ammunition was near total. According to General Prevost, 
the American force at Brier Creek suffered the loss of “seven pieces of cannon, several stand of 
colours, almost all their arms, all their ammunition and baggage which were left to the 
victorious troops.”73 There was also a significant loss of baggage and supplies. This was a 
significant loss of material for an army that could do little to replace it. Worse, it is obvious that 
the British were well aware of this flaw. Colonel Campbell, in a letter to General Sir Henry 
Clinton, alluded to the difficulty in maintaining enough provisions for an army in a place like 
Georgia. He noted that the Americans from South Carolina were “creeping with cautious steps 
down our frontiers.”74 He went on to say that it should be encouraged due to the lack of forage 
and provisions on the frontiers. Campbell stated, “we have already taken care to eat up the 
forage and provisions in that quarter,” and that, “they will be under every inconvenience in the 
supply of those articles.”75 This demonstrates the difficulties of moving large armies across 
areas with little forage. If the British were aware of the difficulties the Americans faced in 
supplying and equipping their army, the American officers were even more aware of the 
problem, as they had to deal with this problem on an all too regular basis. 
 Provisions were a real problem for General Ashe’s army. By the time he reached Brier 
Creek and set up camp, he was running very low on the most basic necessities. In fact, most of 
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the troops in camp were living off of “a half Dozen small potato slips” per day.76 This was hardly 
a meal, even by soldier’s standards from this period, but supplies were scarce. Parties were 
sent out to find forage, but had little or no success in their endeavors. One such party, a unit of 
South Carolina Horse, threatened to return to their homes if they could not find some sort of 
forage for themselves and their horses. They had already been two days without provisions. 
General Ashe was doing everything he could to get supplies and provisions; however, these 
were scarce, particularly in Georgia. General Williamson attempted to help General Ashe by 
sending 40 barrels of flour, but this, like all of the other supplies and equipment, would end up 
falling into enemy hands the day after it arrived in camp.77  
 Worse than the limited amount of food, many of the American soldiers in camp at Brier 
Creek lacked the basic equipment needed for combat. The most obvious example of this is the 
lack of cartouche boxes, which resulted in a significant amount of cartridges being lost or 
destroyed during the fight, something that the American army could not afford to let happen.  
When General Ashe gave the order to beat to arms, many of his men were running to the line 
“carrying their Cartridges under their arms, others in the bosoms of their shirts, and some tied 
up in the corners of their hunting shirts.”78 During his court of enquiry, General Ashe pointed 
this out as one of the reasons he was in such a difficult situation. He also noted that he lacked 
entrenching tools. As a result, he could not build any sort of defensive works around the 
encampment. With basic supplies and equipment scarce in the American army, the loss of any 
                                                          
76
 John Ashe to Richard Caswell, Colonial and State Records of North Carolina, vol. 14, pp. 39-43, 
http://docsouth.unc.edu/csr/index.html/document/csr14-0041. 
77
 John Ashe to Richard Caswell, Colonial and State Records of North Carolina, vol. 14, pp. 39-43, 
http://docsouth.unc.edu/csr/index.html/document/csr14-0041.  
78
 John Ashe to Richard Caswell, Colonial and State Records of North Carolina, vol. 14, pp. 39-43, 
http://docsouth.unc.edu/csr/index.html/document/csr14-0041. 
50 
 
of them was extremely detrimental to its ability to conduct operations against the British. 
General Ashe’s army highlights the supply problem very well. It is for this reason that the Battle 
of Brier Creek was so devastating to Patriot plans in Georgia.79 
 The loss of equipment and supplies at Brier Creek was near total. The rapid approach of 
the enemy meant that the American camp and everything in it had to be abandoned. In the 
heat of battle, most of the men simply threw down their weapons and ran to escape the 
bayonet. William Moultrie summed up the situation after Brier Creek stating, “The loss of arms 
was almost total, and it was a very serious consideration with us, at that time, as we could not 
replace them.”80 Losing so many weapons and ammunition would be a serious blow to any 
army, but in the case of the Americans, it was more so since it was extremely difficult to replace 
any that were lost. Charles Pinckney wrote to William Moultrie, expressing his concern at the 
loss at Brier Creek. Pinckney wrote, “The late great loss of arms, and the daily call for them, 
makes us somewhat uneasy.”81 He went on to say that they had begun requisitioning arms from 
the public stock. This was an extreme measure, but it was obviously a necessary course of 
action to ensure that the militia was fairly well armed.82   
 General Ashe himself was also concerned with the state of his army after the Battle of 
Brier Creek. In a letter to Governor Caswell, Ashe discussed the state of General Bryan’s 
brigade, which was deplorable by this point. Having abandoned all of their equipment during 
their retreat from Brier Creek, General Ashe’s forces lacked basic necessities. Food was scarce 
prior to the battle and after abandoning their camp, the situation would not improve. There 
                                                          
79
 Moultrie, Memoirs, 340. 
80
 Moultrie, Memoirs, 326. 
81
 Moultrie, Memoirs, 329. 
82
 Moultrie, Memoirs, 329-330. 
51 
 
was also a lack of proper clothing for the troops under Ashe’s command. Ashe stated that “the 
whole suffer greatly for the want of cloathes.”83  
This was a serious problem for General Ashe’s men. A lack of proper clothing would 
often lead to sickness. Whether it was disease or malnutrition, 18th century military 
encampments were often filled with unhealthy men. The Patriot camps during the Revolution 
were no exception. According to Ashe, a large percentage of his men were sick, and others 
pretended to be in order to obtain a discharge from service. Ashe stated that he did not have 
time to oversee the examinations himself and that regimental commanders were given the 
task. Ashe went on to note that about three hundred and forty men were sent home, “two-
thirds of which were not really sick.”84 This shows another deleterious effect of the events at 
Brier Creek; a loss of men. After the Battle of Brier Creek, the loss of men, either to the battle or 
to sickness or desertion, was a serious concern for American commanders in the southern 
colonies.85 
 The Patriot army in the southern colonies could not afford to lose any soldiers. Though 
their numbers had continually increased during the months leading up to the Battle of Brier 
Creek, many of these men were part of militia units coming from North Carolina. Georgia and 
South Carolina did not have a comparable population, which meant there were fewer men to 
draw on for militia or Continental regiments. Furthermore, the militia was often unreliable 
leading to the need to have large numbers of militia to outnumber their opponents. 
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Unfortunately, increased numbers did not make the militia any more reliable, but it did give the 
Rebels a better chance at success. Without training and proper accoutrements, Patriot 
commanders hoped that they could at the very least outnumber the British. As General 
Moultrie pointed out, before the unfortunate events at Brier Creek, the Patriots were hoping 
for a force of more than 7,000 men. Even though most of this was militia, it was still a sizable 
army capable of threatening the British in Savannah and the surrounding areas. But the loss of 
so many of General Ashe’s men at Brier Creek meant this was no longer the case.86  
 Getting accurate casualty numbers for any engagement is always a difficult task. In the 
case of the Battle of Brier Creek, the confusion of the battle and subsequent retreat makes it 
even more difficult, or even impossible, to determine exact numbers. It is, however, possible to 
determine an approximate figure for casualties of this battle by looking at a variety of sources, 
both American and British. Given the panicked nature of the American retreat and the 
desertions that accompanied such a defeat, it is likely that the American commanders were 
unaware of exact figures for battlefield losses. The British on the other hand, captured a large 
number of troops and had access to the dead and wounded, with the exception of those that 
drowned in the Savannah River. By any estimate, the casualty numbers for the Americans at the 
Battle of Brier Creek were high. 
 General Ashe took note of the losses in a letter to Governor Richard Caswell. Ashe 
stated that there were only about 150 men missing after the battle. Fifty of these were believed 
to have crossed the river north of the Brier Creek and continued on to North Carolina. This 
letter was written on March 17 and the whereabouts of those men was still unknown. It is 
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probable that those were not the only individuals to continue running until they reached their 
homes. The numbers provided by General Ashe are likely optimistic estimates in order to 
downplay the severity of the loss of men. It was also difficult for any commander to keep 
precise counts of the troops under their command during this period. There were regular 
desertions in the army and the number of men sick and the number fit for duty was constantly 
changing. This is especially true of American officers in the southern colonies. It was relatively 
easy for men to desert their unit and return home. The rout at Brier Creek encouraged many to 
leave before their enlistments were up and risk the punishment rather than staying and running 
the risk of being caught in another massacre.87 General William Moultrie noted in his memoirs 
that “We never could ascertain the number of men that were lost in this unfortunate affair, as 
many of them made no stay any where until they got to their own homes in North-Carolina.”88 
 A more accurate account of the casualties can be had from the British sources, as they 
were more thorough in their reporting of engagements. Sadly, even they cannot provide much 
information on American desertions. General Augustine Prevost wrote to Lord George Germain 
detailing the battle and the losses inflicted upon the Americans. General Prevost stated that 
“about 150 were killed on the field of battle and adjoining woods and swamps, but their chief 
loss consists in the number of officers and men drowned in attempting to save themselves from 
the slaughter and plunging into a deep and rapid river.”89 By this account, General Ashe lost at 
least 150 men in the battle, and an unknown number more were lost trying to swim the 
Savannah River. This figure also did not include those captured during the battle. In this early 
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report, Prevost noted that the patriots captured were “The second-in-command, Brig.-General 
Elbert, one of their best officers, several more of note, in the whole 27 officers were taken with 
near two hundred men.”90 This number is relatively close to a later count of prisoners by 
Prevost after having been asked by General Benjamin Lincoln for a tally of prisoners taken at 
Brier Creek. According to this, there were 162 men captured at Brier Creek, along with 24 
officers, including General Elbert. Going by these numbers, General Ashe lost approximately 
336 men killed, wounded, or captured. There is always the possibility that the British 
exaggerated the number of killed and wounded, but the number of prisoners was given to 
General Lincoln by General Prevost for a prisoner exchange. The casualty numbers could have 
been lower, but they could also have been higher. Many men drowned trying to swim across 
the Savannah River and they are not included in those numbers. Either way, it was a significant 
number, considering the small populations of the southern colonies from which to recruit new 
soldiers. This figure also does not include desertions, which were a problem at all times during 
the American Revolution. Perhaps most important in all of this is the loss of an entire regiment 
of  well trained and well armed Continental troops, along with an intelligent and able 
commander in General Samuel Elbert.91  
 The importance of Continental troops throughout the Revolutionary War cannot be 
overstated. Militia units made up the majority of the Patriot armies and their track record was 
less than stellar. In many engagements, the militia would break rank and run as was the case at 
Brier Creek. Continental troops, however, were fairly well trained and disciplined and often 
held their ground. They were better equipped and had bayonets to defend themselves against 
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charging British regulars. Militiamen were not trained to stand up to bayonets charges, nor 
were they properly equipped for it. This made the militia a weak point in the Patriot army and 
the British were well aware of that situation. Continentals posed a real threat to the British 
when they were gathered in force. General Prevost notes the lack of Continentals at Charleston 
as a weakness that could be exploited. In a letter to General Sir Henry Clinton after the Battle of 
Brier Creek, Prevost states, “if an additional force could possibly be spared to attack Charles 
Town, where there are few of the Continental Troops left, I am convinced the Conquest of 
South Carolina would be easily accomplished.”92 The fact that Prevost points out the lack of 
Continental troops at Charleston is noteworthy. It is obvious that the British were aware that 
their chances for success were always better when there were fewer Continentals in the field.93  
 Patriot officers were also keenly aware of the value of Continental units in their army. 
Continentals were more likely to hold their ground and their training. The discipline that came 
from training put Continentals on a more even footing with British regulars.  Continental troops 
were also better equipped for combat than the militia, though that is not surprising. General 
Lincoln, in a letter to Governor Rutledge, expressed his belief that the situation in the southern 
colonies was far from ideal for the Americans and that the British were aware of it. Lincoln 
notes that the British would likely expect little resistance in Georgia, “considering the apparent 
aversion of the militia, in general, to take the field.”94 Lincoln goes on to mention “the few 
Continental troops in the department,” as another weakness of American forces in Georgia and 
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the Carolinas.95 Having disciplined Continentals within the ranks was an advantage for any 
American commander. At the Battle of Brier Creek, General Elbert’s Georgia Continentals held 
their ground and continued fighting while lines of militia all around them broke and ran at the 
sight of bayonets. In a letter to General Moultrie, Colonel Charles Pinckney expressed concern 
that the situation for the southern army might have been worse than he was told, with 
particular regard to the loss of the Georgia Continentals in their entirety. Pinckney states, “by 
some letters now in town, we are told things are much in a much worse situation than you 
speak of: such as the loss of Col. Elbert and all his regulars.”96 American officers were obviously 
concerned by the loss of an entire Continental regiment at the Battle of Brier Creek. Training 
and supplying the Continentals took a great deal of time and money. Thus any losses to 
Continental numbers were a severe blow to the American war effort. In an engagement, the 
chances of success for the Americans were much higher if they possessed a larger number of 
Continental troops. Add to this the increasing problem of desertions within the militia after the 
Battle of Brier Creek, and it is easy to see how that unfortunate battle crippled the American 
army in the southern colonies.97  
 The loss of men, both Continental troops and militia, was a staggering blow to General 
Benjamin Lincoln’s war plans in Georgia and South Carolina. The capture of an entire 
Continental regiment was devastating, as was the high casualties among the militia units. While 
battlefield losses were high, the loss of men did not stop there. Desertions were always a 
problem for American armies in the Revolutionary War. In the aftermath of the Battle of Brier 
                                                          
95
 Benjamin Lincoln to Governor Rutledge, Benjamin Lincoln Letter Book, Massachusetts Historical Society, 189-
191. 
96
 Moultrie, Memoirs, 327. 
97
 Moultrie, Memoirs, 325-327. 
57 
 
Creek, the desertion problem became even more evident. Some men ran from the field and 
never returned. Many others left camp days or weeks later. General Lincoln needed every man 
that he could get if he hoped to at least contain the British in Georgia. With rampant 
desertions, any operations against the British were becoming a forlorn hope.  
 A lack of discipline and the tendency to desert were two of the most notable problems 
of the militia. General Moultrie knew this fact all too well and described the problem in a letter 
to Colonel Pinckney. Moultrie refers to the American troops as undisciplined and goes on to say 
that “they soon grow tired and desert; too much of which we have sensibly felt.”98 He went on 
to point out that many of those deserters were going over to the British. Of course, Moultrie 
believed that skirmishes would keep the militia occupied, while Colonel Pinckney questioned 
the wisdom of such actions. After all, the Americans could not afford another disaster such as 
the Battle of Brier Creek. In another letter, written some ten days later, General Moultrie 
offered Governor Rutledge the current plan of action in Georgia and South Carolina.  Moultrie 
stated, with clear disappointment, “I am sorry to inform you that our desertions still 
continue.”99   
 Desertions plague armies at all times but at no time is it worse than during a retreat, or 
in the case of the engagement at Brier Creek, a rout. General Ashe originally claimed that only 
150 men were missing from his army. This was obviously not an accurate number, since at least 
50 of those missing were deserters. Ashe stated that they “crossed the River above and 
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returned to our State”100 of North Carolina. He also made another separate statement 
regarding the desertion problem, stating that it, among other things, had “rendered my 
command very disagreeable.”101 The number of deserters was likely much higher than that 
mentioned. Ashe managed to prevent the desertion of between two or three hundred men 
who were fleeing during the battle. General Ashe ordered them to be stopped and, upon 
learning that they were under his command, brought them back to camp. With so many men 
fleeing through swamps and trying to cross the Savannah River, it is easy to imagine how so 
many men could simply march home without anyone knowing. With limited knowledge of 
those captured or killed, General Ashe had no way of truly knowing who deserted, who was 
captured or who was killed. This was obviously too much temptation for undisciplined 
militiamen, and thus continued to be a thorn in the side of American commanders.102  
 Battlefield losses and desertions were not the only ways in which Patriot officers lost 
men. Sickness and disease ravaged Eighteenth century army camps, and American camps were 
no different. Many men became ill and were unfit for duty, while some pretended to be sick in 
order to be sent away from the front lines or even discharged entirely. General Ashe was upset 
at the loss of men who were not really sick. Ashe had received orders to discharge any men that 
were sick or unfit for duty. According to Ashe, the short notice of the order prevented him from 
being present at the examinations. Instead, he was forced to rely on the commanding officer of 
each regiment. Obviously, Ashe did not trust the judgment of those officers because he stated 
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that they “permitted about three hundred and forty to return home.”103 He went on to 
question the health of those discharged, saying that “two-thirds of which were not really 
sick.”104 Ashe also added that with the addition of 50 or 60 desertions that they had lost 
approximately 400 men. Of those still in camp, many were sick yet remained in service. This 
further highlights the problems of losing men in the Patriot camp and how detrimental the loss 
of so many at Brier Creek was to the war effort. Even though desertion was always a problem 
for the Patriots, there can be little doubt the traumatic events at the Battle of Brier Creek led 
many good men to desert. For those who finished out their enlistments, there was little that 
could entice them to remain in service and risk being part of another rout at the hands of the 
British.105 
 The Battle of Brier Creek came at a very inopportune time for the Patriots. Many of the 
enlistments for the militia would run out approximately one month later. After taking part in 
such a terrible defeat and scrambling for their lives, many men did not reenlist, despite 
incentives provided by their respective states or commanding officers. Incentives such as 
increased compensation or bonuses for reenlisting had often been used to maintain the ranks 
of the Patriot armies. After the engagement at Brier Creek, however, the Rebel southern army 
would fail to reenlist many of those men who witnessed that unfortunate event. Charles 
Pinckney wrote to William Moultrie that efforts should be made to encourage the reenlistment 
of as much of the militia as possible for another one or two months. Good housing and better 
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pay were offered for their continued services. Still, few would be willing to stay for even a short 
time beyond their enlistment.106  
 General Lincoln also saw the need to reenlist as much of the militia as they could, 
despite their dismal record in combat. Lincoln needed as many men under arms as he could get, 
militia or otherwise. Much of General Ashe’s army was made up of militia and their enlistments 
ended about a month after the Battle of Brier Creek. General Lincoln requested that General 
Ashe try to persuade as many as possible to reenlist for a short time. Ashe’s plea to his men fell 
on deaf ears. General Lincoln received the following response from Ashe: “Sir, Agreeable to 
your desire of yesterday, and my instructions from his Excellency, Gov. Caswell, I have 
endeavored to persuade this Brigade to continue in Service two months longer, or at least till 
the reinforcement from our State arrives. I am sorry to inform you that there was but one man 
consented to continue.”107 
Governor Caswell received much the same response as General Lincoln when he tried to 
encourage reenlistment. Despite his best efforts and the offer of increased pay for a short 
extension of their service, the men of General Bryan’s Brigade were unwilling to stay any 
longer. General Rutherford’s Brigade also refused to continue in service. According to Ashe, 
“few or none of General Rutherford’s Brigade will continue in this service longer than the 10th 
of April.”108 Then, as if to punctuate the dismal state of affairs of the American forces in the 
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south, Ashe noted that “Things here wear a melancholy appearance.”109 This statement shows 
not only the unfortunate circumstances of the Patriots but also the steep decline in moral in the 
month after the Battle of Brier Creek. As for the many men who refused to reenlist, it easy to 
understand why. Many had been a part of a terrible defeat. They witnessed firsthand many of 
their fellow soldiers perishing or being captured. Those that were not present at Brier Creek on 
March 3 likely heard countless tales of horror from those that were there. Under such 
circumstances, it is not surprising that none of these men were willing to risk being a part of 
another massacre in exchange for a small pay increase. For most, more money simply was not 
worth it.110  
Enlisted men were not the only individuals who were unwilling to continue in the service 
after the Battle of Brier Creek. There is at least one example of a high ranking officer resigning 
in the weeks after the battle. General William Bryan resigned his commission on April 27, 1779, 
citing his lack of experience as a military officer and listing his expedition to Georgia as an 
example. General Bryan placed much of the blame for the debacle on himself for moving the 
American camp at Brier Creek. After witnessing the massacre at Brier Creek and its deleterious 
effects on the American war effort, General Bryan believed the cause would be better served 
by his resignation. He wrote to Governor Caswell that there was, “so little prospect of being 
serviceable to my Country and acquitting myself with repute.”111 The reason for this was that 
he lacked experience and training to be an officer which he concluded after taking part in a 
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terrible defeat for the Rebel army. Thus, General Lincoln lost General Bryan to resignation, 
General Elbert to capture, and General Ashe was so demoralized as to be of little use, all of 
which resulted from the Battle of Brier Creek.112 
 The Patriots faced many problems that resulted from the losses at the Battle of Brier 
Creek. The loss of supplies and arms was near total, and created a serious problem for the 
Rebels as they had significant difficulties in replacing them. It would be quite some time before 
the nearly 1,000 arms lost at Brier Creek could be replaced. Needless to say, those losses 
effectively prevented any serious offensive operations against the British. The Rebel army was 
already short on supplies and food stuffs. The fiasco at Brier Creek simply added to those 
shortages. General Ashe and General Lincoln could not afford to lose anything, but 
unfortunately, almost all of the supplies of Ashe’s army fell into enemy hands. There was also a 
significant amount of flour that ended up being captured along with the weaponry and supplies 
left behind by fleeing militiamen.113  
 Perhaps even more damaging to American efforts in Georgia was the loss of an entire 
Continental Regiment and its very able commander Samuel Elbert. Continental troops were an 
extremely valuable commodity to American commanding officers and the loss of any was a 
severe blow. Even the British General Prevost had a grudging respect for the Continentals, 
further highlighting their value in the field. They were better trained and better equipped than 
their militia brethren and thus were not as likely to break rank and run at the sight of British 
bayonets. The loss of Elbert and his Georgia Continentals was a damaging blow to General 
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Lincoln’s plans for Georgia. When an American general lost or lacked Continental regiments, he 
was usually forced to compensate with additional militia units. After the Battle of Brier Creek, 
even that would be an issue. 
 In the panic of battle and the rout that ensued at Brier Creek, many men simply ran for 
their lives and continued to do so for some time. A number of these men simply kept walking 
and did not stop until they reached their homes, many of which were in North Carolina. These 
desertions were difficult to prevent since General Ashe did not know how many were killed, 
wounded, or captured in the battle. This in itself was bad, but it did not stop there. Desertions 
would continue to plague the American camps for quite some time. It was a serious concern for 
basically every American officer. The events at Brier Creek exacerbated this problem as so many 
men were willing to desert and risk punishment rather than face another British bayonet 
charge. For those that stayed until their enlistments ran up, there was little their commanding 
officers could offer that would entice them to stay. After the traumatizing events at Brier Creek, 
few were willing to stay even for a short time.  
 The loss of men and supplies was a terrible blow to the American army in the south. The 
desertions and the unwillingness of militia to reenlist meant that any offensive plans against 
the British had to be put on hold. This gave the British a great deal of time to finish their 
defensive works around Savannah and to plan ahead for their next operation. Despite the 
continued efforts of General Lincoln, the Battle of Brier Creek crushed any hopes of a quick 
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offensive against the British and demoralized the American army. General Ashe was correct 
when he said, “Things here wear a melancholy appearance.”114  
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CHAPTER 5 
Georgia Lost 
            The Battle of Brier Creek could easily be called a disaster for the Americans in the 
southern colonies. The defeat effectively ended any hopes of an immediate American offensive 
against the British in Georgia and crushed the morale of American troops in Georgia and South 
Carolina. It changed the course of the conflict in Georgia and gave the British ample time to 
complete their work on fortifications in and around Savannah. The British success at Brier Creek 
allowed them to continue their Southern Strategy and eventually move into South Carolina and 
then North Carolina. The Americans had an opportunity to unite their forces and possibly drive 
the British out of Georgia. The Battle of Brier Creek effectively slammed the door on that 
opportunity for the Americans and gave the British one of their own. 
            Despite the importance of the Battle of Brier Creek, it has sadly been understudied. The 
historiography is rather short and there are only a handful of articles that focus solely on the 
events at Brier Creek. More often than not, information about the Battle of Brier Creek will be 
found in books dealing with either the Southern Campaign or the Revolution in Georgia. There 
are several books that have information about this little known battle, but in most it is just a 
cursory examination and none of them delve into the consequences of it on the larger course of 
the war. In many works, the Battle of Brier Creek is overlooked completely. This is unfortunate 
as the battle had much more of an impact than might be expected. 
            Some historians, such as Kenneth Coleman and Leslie Hall, mentioned the importance of 
the battle in their respective works. They stated that the battle prolonged the war in the south, 
but they failed to provide any supporting evidence. Instead, they left it as a simple statement at 
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the end of their discussion of the battle. There is ample evidence to support this idea, but no 
one has put it all together in a coherent argument. David K. Wilson, in his book The Southern 
Strategy, discussed the battle at length, but he chose not to discuss the consequences of the 
battle. Joshua B. Howard and Otis Ashmore and Charles Olmstead all put together excellent 
articles about the Battle of Brier Creek, but again they did not look into how the battle affected 
the British or the Americans and their respective war plans. Howard’s work has a promising 
introduction focusing on the importance of the battle, but in the end it falls short examining the 
consequences. Like most other works dealing the Battle of Brier Creek, Howard’s is basically an 
account of the battle and not the affects of it on the larger course of the war.115  
            Other authors have ignored the Battle of Brier Creek completely, even when discussing 
events in Georgia. Some only make a brief mention of it and then move on to something else. 
There are several reasons why this has been the case. First and foremost, the number of 
documents relevant to the Battle of Brier Creek and its consequences are few and far between. 
Many of these documents are scattered across the eastern United States, making it difficult to 
bring them all together. Fortunately, many of these documents have been digitized and/or put 
onto microfilm, making it easier to obtain them. As far as the scarcity of documents relevant to 
the battle, there are more than enough to determine that this battle was more important than 
has generally been thought. There are other reasons that the battle has been overlooked. 
Patriotic American historians may have steered clear of it because it was such an 
embarrassment for the Patriots and their cause, while others did so because it was also a very 
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brief engagement involving small armies. Whatever the reason, it is unfortunate that the 
consequences of the Battle of Brier Creek have been ignored for so long. 
            The Battle of Brier Creek had many consequences. It resulted in a substantial loss of men 
and equipment for the Patriots, along with a loss in momentum and a severe drop in morale. 
For the British this battle allowed them to secure their position in Georgia and maintain their 
southern strategy. The southern strategy of the British relied heavily on loyalists flocking to the 
King’s Colors when the army arrived. From these loyalists a militia would be created that could 
defend the conquests already made by British regulars. To obtain loyalist support, however, the 
British had to show that they could ensure the safety of loyalists in Georgia. Momentum would 
play a large role in this. The British needed swift decisive victories to show their superiority. The 
hope was that the sight of the British marching through Georgia would rally the spirits of 
loyalists who had been living under patriot authority for quite some time. In the beginning, the 
British succeeded.116  
            By the March 3, 1779, the British had lost most, if not all, of the momentum that they 
had built up in the months preceding the Battle of Brier Creek. Colonel Campbell’s force was 
under the very real threat of being cut off from reinforcements in Savannah. If that had 
happened, a larger Rebel force could have overrun his army, should they have chosen to bring 
together their forces for such an attack. The Rebels were preparing to unite their forces for an 
all out assault on Savannah instead with a force of around 7,000 men, a sizable force to say the 
least. It is very possible that this force could have driven the British out of Savannah, or at the 
                                                          
116
 Wilson, The Southern Strategy, 81-98. 
68 
 
very least, bottled them up inside the town. The British needed a decisive and swift victory to 
reverse their fortunes in Georgia. The Battle of Brier Creek provided exactly that.117  
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